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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2013 renowned North American Lutheran ethicists in the field of ecotheology 
published two substantial monographs. Larry Rasmussen’s latest monograph 
entitled Earth Honoring Faith: Religious Ethics in a New Key (461 pp), was published 
by Oxford University Press, while Cynthia Moe-Lobeda’s Resisting Structural Evil: 
Love as Ecological-Economic Vocation (306 pp) was published by Fortress Press. 
Rasmussen is the emeritus Reinhold Niebuhr Professor at Union Theological 
Seminar in New York while Moe-Lobeda (Rasmussen’s former student) is Wismer 
Professor of Gender and Diversity Studies at Seattle University.
As may be expected, there are several similarities between the two texts. Perhaps 
the crucial aspect is the mapping of moral categories that Rasmussen developed in 
earlier contributions and that Moe-Lobeda takes over and develops further from her 
mentor (who also wrote the foreword for her book). In both cases a central place 
is given to the emergence of a moral vision. I will return to this in the discussion 
below. Both come from the Lutheran tradition and from a school of Christian ethics 
influenced by Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Both write from within the North American 
context and engage critically with (mainly) North American readers. Both texts are 
particularly well written. Rasmussen’s style is evocative and at times poetic. Moe-
Lobeda writes in a prophetic mode, interspersed with social analysis, theological 
commentary and a narrative mode of moral discourse indicative of what she 
describes. There is a welcome sensitivity to religious plurality in both texts although 
Rasmussen draws far more extensively on non-Christian tradition than Moe-
Lobeda does. Given her targeted readers she emphasises the unique burden and 
responsibility of Christianity in North America (2013:8).
In this review essay I will focus on the category of the emergence of a moral vision 
that both authors emphasise. I will show how the notion of critical moral vision 
helps to identify and assess the root causes of economic inequalities and ecological 
destruction in terms of structural violence, structural evil and the very nature of sin. 
Such a moral vision also forms the key but by itself remains insufficient for social 
transformation. The influence of such insights in the South African context will 
be illustrated with reference to teaching and research done at the University of the 
Western Cape and, more specifically, the category of transfiguration in Desmond 
Tutu’s theology.
2. RASMUSSEN ON AN EARTH HONORING FAITH
In his earlier work Rasmussen (1972/2005) engaged extensively with Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s Christian ethics. He learned from Bonhoeffer an emphasis on the role 
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of community, the need for moral formation in moral communities and to maintain 
ecumenical networks. He expressed a deep concern over the fragmentation of such 
moral communities in Moral Fragments, Moral Community (1983). He also learned 
from Bonhoeffer the need to relate such an emphasis on moral community to 
contextual challenges. For Bonhoeffer, this was shaped by the need for communities 
of resistance in the context of anti-Semitism. For Rasmussen, the context is 
increasingly shaped by the environmental impact of neo-liberal globalisation. In The 
Predicament of the Prosperous (1978) that he co-authored with Bruce Birch he already 
described the impact of consumerism on moral communities. In Earth Community, 
Earth Ethics (1996) he then developed the notion of “sustainable community” as an 
alternative ecumenical vision amidst social, economic and ecological disintegration. 
This is also a dominant theme in Ethics for a Small Planet (1998), which he co-
authored with Dan Maguire. Drawing on the ecumenical root metaphor of the 
whole household of God, he pointed to the etymological roots of the English words 
economy, ecology and ecumenical in the Greek oikos (household). He rooted 
this notion of household in the so-called “great economy”, namely the underlying 
structure of the earth’s ecosystems – which constitutes an “earth community”.
All these themes come together and are developed further in Earth Honoring Faith, 
which may well constitute Rasmussen’s magnum opus. The book is structured in 
two parts. In the first part there are chapters on the kind of “creatures we are” and 
the “world we have”, drawing insights mainly from other disciplines. In a chapter 
on “The faith we seek” he argues that any response to ecological destruction from 
within religious communities have to be deeply rooted in the symbols of a particular 
tradition. While he draws throughout the book on sources in other religious 
traditions, this clearly also applies to Christianity. In four chapters he then develops 
“the ethic we need”. He develops a map of moral categories (2013:127-159) in which 
the role of goals, values, duties (also principles and rules) and virtues are integrated 
with one another on the basis of the crucial role played by moral vision (and moral 
imagination). He comments that moral vision is powerful and moves multitudes, 
albeit often slowly (2013:147). It provides the basic storyline for the morality we live 
by (2013:145). He adds that: “Moral vision and moral narrative may change, and do. 
But then the story changes, as do the optics, and a different life is lived” (2013:145). 
The specific vision that Rasmussen has in mind is that of the world as oikos, that 
is, of economics, ecology and ecumenics as interrelated dimensions of the same 
world (2013:148). This requires a notion of eco-justice (see 2013:150-159) where 
economic growth and high levels of consumption are no longer the main markers 
of well-being.
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On its own moral vision would of course not suffice. Behavioural change often 
precedes attitudinal change (2013:119). Rasmussen therefore describes the 
“dialectic of change” in anticipatory communities in terms of four “notes”: 1) For 
deep change to happen, the drag of normalcy must be resisted and conventional 
wisdom doubted; 2) Leadership and the first initiatives for major change, including 
perspectival change usually come from minority communities at the edges or bottom 
of society; 3) While almost every change movement is begun by the dreamers, it 
fails if influential allies in privileged circles are not forthcoming; and 4) Change 
that addresses today’s wicked problems for the sake of new first works requires that 
we understand complex adaptive systems (2013:121-124). Such insights are then 
developed further in chapters on the role of moral community within the context of 
civil society (2013:160-190) and sustainable earthkeeping practices amidst the quest 
for environmental justice (2013:191) – a chapter that could also have been moved to 
the latter half of the book.
In the second part of the book Rasmussen develops selected themes further in order 
to outline an alternative moral vision. He explores an appreciation for asceticism 
amidst consumerism (also with reference to the Eucharist), for the sacred amidst 
commodification, (with reference to debates on water) for prophetic liberative 
practices amidst oppression and for wisdom amidst folly. These chapters show a 
master at work, one who can attend to the detail required in local contexts but who 
maintains a cosmic vision throughout.
I want to focus here on a specific aspect of Rasmussen’s argument, namely the 
diagnosis of the underlying problem. Following observations from Daniel Quinn’s 
text Ishmael Ras mussen raises the question why we don’t just stop when we know 
that we are destroying the world around us (2013:89). Why do the injuries of 
nature delight us (2013:89)? He considers various answers: a lack of compassion, 
a reductionist utilitarian logic, a managerial anthropocentrism, ignorance of the 
consequences, human arrogance as a self-segregated species, turned in upon itself 
(cor curvatum in se), setting itself apart from the community of life, the abuse of 
power and privilege together with the inequalities and injustices that flow from 
power imbalances as a result of greed (the will to power), and pervasive ideologies. 
It is indeed remarkable how fruitful the traditional Christian vocabulary on the 
nature of sin has proved to be in order to identify the root causes of environmental 
destruction (see Cloete 2013). Sin is at once manifested in anthropocentrism (pride), 
consumerism (greed), a lack of development (sloth), domination in the name of 
difference (violence) and human alienation from the rest nature (the privation of the 
good – see Rasmussen 2013:209). It may be necessary to acknowledge that language 
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about original sin obscures more than what it reveals (2013:99), but there can be no 
doubt about persistence of what Rasmussen calls “pervasive perversity” (2013:100).
Rasmussen then offers a constructive contribution on the basis of a rereading of the 
ethic of masters and slaves. He describes the Earth / human relationship as one of 
subject-over-object and mind-over nature that yields a “paradigm of domination that 
renders nature essentially a slave to humanity, its steward and master” (2013:100). He 
criticises a stewardship ethic on this basis, reminding us that white Christian slave-
owners considered themselves to be good stewards of slaves. The rest of nature has 
become enslaved to serve human purposes. Rasmussen adds: “Slaves are certainly 
not dispensable. But they are replaceable; one can substitute for another. This is the 
master/slave ethic in pure form” (2013:100). He adds that it is unnerving to realise 
how “natural” this relationship has remained for self-appointed stewards of nature 
given how stewardship mimics the relationship between master and slave and even 
though slavery is no longer permitted.
Rasmussen is very much aware of how such a master / slave dialectic becomes 
embedded in the structures of society. He labels this “structural sin”, a theme 
developed more fully by Moe-Lobeda. He observes that the prophetic imagination 
has a keen sensitivity for institu tion alised practices, the habits by which we live. 
He says: “The practices of systems and structures are the true judges of how we’re 
doing. Ideological claims, creeds, beliefs, rituals, and the noise of solemn assemblies 
pale alongside routine practice as the measure of our lives” (Rasmussen 2013:306). 
He adds provocatively: “Tell us your income and your zip code and we will tell you 
how you live and the world it creates. We’ll describe your education, diet, energy use 
and transportation. We’ll describe the housing you have, the company you keep, the 
way you spend your leisure time, and how you treat your neighbours and the world” 
(2013:306). This, he also observes, applies irrespective of religious persuasions. Such 
structures of domination call for prophetic critique – and leads Rasmussen to a 
discussion of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Martin Luther King Jr. and Mohandas Ghandi.
Moe-Lobeda suggests that more than prophetic critique is necessary in order to 
address structural violence. Rasmussen would concur. He calls for an interplay 
between prophetic-liberative traditions and the moral formation in anticipatory 
communities. Prophets attend to institutional justice better than virtue traditions and 
recognise that behavioural change may well precede attitudinal change. However, it 
cannot be assumed that virtue will always finds its way: “Prophetic traditions are, 
however, oftentimes impatient with the long, slow schooling of the very character 
and conscience they cannot do without. They organize union members and college 
students but not preschoolers” (Rasmussen 2013:363).
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What is needed is both ongoing moral formation and the institutional scaffolding of 
a just way of life (2013:363). The source of inspiration for that, Rasmussen believes, 
will best come from “sacred strangers in secular society, embedded in deeply rooted 
faith traditions, who can recast older insights into new patterns that can address 
adaptive challenges of the day (2013:364). This is the making of the moral vision for 
an emerging order. This requires focal practices in deeply rooted, shared traditions, 
a life of discipleship, an appreciation of the various “stations” on a journey (or 
pilgrimage) of faith, with some cairns along the way, and the practising of arcane 
disciplines (Bonhoeffer) (2013:232-235).
3. MOE-LOBEDA ON RESISTING STRUCTURAL EVIL
In response to the question as to why we don’t just stop when we realise we are 
destroying what is precious, Rasmussen acknowledges that most people, including 
most rich people, don’t want to destroy the world (Rasmussen 2013:94). It is not 
malice that is the problem. This is the point of departure for Cynthia Moe-Lobeda’s 
analysis of structural evil. She addresses her book specifically and quite narrowly to 
North Americans who are “over con sumers” (2013:5) and economically “privileged” 
(2013:11). They regard themselves as com passionate and well-intentioned citizens 
but their ways of living are embedded in economic structures that are causing gross 
economic inequalities as well as ecological destruction (2013:31-45). As a result, 
structures of exploitation persist but those who benefit from such structures fail to 
recognise and resist them (2013:4). She asks provocatively: “What does it mean for 
us, killers, to claim moral lives?” (2013:4).
The answer for Moe-Lobeda lies in an analysis of structural violence (a sociological 
concept derived from the peace research of Johann Galtung) that she re-describes 
as “structural evil” (a theological concept) (2013:49). Structural violence refers to 
the physical, psychological and spiritual harm that some experience as a result of 
an unequal distribution of power but also to the complicity and acquiescence of 
those who benefit from that (2013:72). While direct violence is an event, structural 
violence is embedded in structures and processes (2013:75). The prime examples of 
such structural violence are the ideologies of racism, classism and sexism but it also 
becomes evident in the build-up of weapons and anthropogenic climate change, 
more specifically climate debt (2013:59).
Moe-Lobeda acknowledges notions of sin as ignorance, greed and arrogance and 
emphasise the role of violence (“crucifying Earth” – 2013:56), but the main gist of 
her argument is to focus on what has traditionally been called sin as power, i.e. 
the way in which whole societies become collectively trapped in structures that 
are violent. In other words: while Rasmussen seeks to explain the root causes of 
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structural evil in terms of the very nature of sin, Moe-Lobeda emphasises the 
consequences of sin with specific reference to structural evil. For Moe-Lobeda sin 
is not merely wrongdoing (through attitudes, thoughts, words or deeds) but a state 
of disorientation where people have become curved in upon themselves (2013:58). 
Her argument is not merely that sin becomes embedded in structural forms, but 
that the implications of that for the practice of faith remain largely unacknowledged 
(2013:58). She identifies four features of structural evil, namely its invisibility to 
those who do not suffer directly from that (breeding complicity), the fact that it 
is sustained irrespective of the virtue or vice of people involved, its transmission 
from one generation to the next unless exposed, confronted and resisted, and its 
expansion as a result of the concentration of power, for example in the case of neo-
liberal globalisation (2013:60-64).
How is it possible that virtuous people (who in their self-understanding seek to live 
moral lives) can support an evil system (a question also discussed with reference to 
apartheid South Africa)? How is such moral oblivion and the abdication of moral 
power possible? How can evil appear to be disguised as light (Bonhoeffer) (2013:66)? 
How does structural evil manage to remain hidden beyond recognition for its 
perpetrators and beneficiaries? Drawing on Antonio Gramsci and Cornel West, 
Moe-Lobeda argues that this is possible as a result of hegemonic vision (2013:86). 
This hides the truth both from perpetrators and victims of evil systems. In this 
way people can come to consent to social systems (even slavery, colonial rule and 
domestic violence) through which they are oppressed and exploited. In an excellent 
analysis she identifies eight factors contributing to hegemonic vision amongst her 
primary readers, namely well-intentioned, compassionate over-consumers in North 
America who live in ways that are based on systems of structural violence that 
impoverish others and cause ecological destruction. These are 1) a privatised morality 
based on charity, 2) gratitude for the many “blessings” received from God, 3) denial 
through self-justification, 4) a sense of hopelessness and perceived powerlessness 
given the “inevitability” of current systems, 5) unconscious con formity to social 
pressures, for example through advertising, 6) corporate investment in maintaining 
moral oblivion through public relations exercises, 7) the assumption that economic 
growth is necessary, and 8) moral oblivion, that is, practiced denial in the name of 
powerlessness (2013:88-104).
Drawing on Rasmussen’s work, Moe-Lobeda concurs that hegemonic vision is best 
countered through the emergence of a critical moral vision. She takes the argument 
forward by suggesting that moral vision has several distinct dimensions that include 
seeing what is, what has gone wrong and what is not yet there but ought to be. Seeing 
and judging are therefore co-original. This point is not always recognised in the widely 
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used see-judge-act method. If social analysis necessarily precedes discernment, then 
social analysis may easily determine the content of theological reflection. It is not 
possible to see what is wrong without seeing what ought to be – precisely because 
evil can become disguised and hidden from the consciousness of perpetrators and 
through false consciousness even from victims. Evil can be portrayed in multiple 
ways as normal, obvious, necessary and therefore as somehow acceptable, if not 
always hidden. It can even be paraded as fate, divinely mandated, or as punishment 
for sin 2013:66-68). The evil embedded in structural violence shows a tendency to 
hide itself through selective morality and especially selective justice. Evil that is not 
recognised for what it is cannot be addressed and resisted (2013:258). It can only be 
seen when the possibility of alternatives is recognised.
On this basis Moe-Lobeda outlines three dimensions of a moral vision: a clearer 
vision of economic and ecological injustices, a vision of sustainable alternatives 
and the moral power to embraces these alternatives (see 2013:5, 112, 299). The last 
of these is elicited by “mystical seeing, i.e. “seeing ever more fully the life-giving, 
life-saving Mystery that is God flowing and pouring through all of creation, and 
working there toward creation’s suffering” (2013:299). Here she builds on the mystic 
vision of an indwelling God developed in her earlier work Healing a Broken World 
(2002:73-99) that also called for a subversive moral agency. This mystical vision is 
one of seeing the world through the eyes of God. She says: “To see oneself through 
the eyes of God, to see what God sees, is to see a human creature loved beyond 
comprehension” (2013:140). She adds: “To see others through the eyes of God is 
to see them first and foremost as precious beloved creatures of God” (2013:140). 
This enables her to see God as “flowing and pouring through all things” (2013:140-
144). She acknowledges God’s tran scen dence but stresses God’s immanent presence 
as guiding, empowering and equipping (2013:142). On this basis she affirms God’s 
love for (human) creatures as liberating in that it overcomes alienation (sin) and 
enables justice-making love for God, others and the Earth (2013:145). She develops 
this mystical vision in a Trinitarian way and suggests that this opens a “horizon of 
hope” that evil is ultimately overcome by the power of God’s love (2013:153). Her 
intuition is that moral inertia is born from a lack of hope that structural violence can 
be overcome (2013:153).
In the second half of the book Moe-Lobeda explains how the “seeds of hope” elicited 
by such a mystical vision may be translated despite the pernicious presence of evil 
towards love as economic-ecological vocation (the sub-title of her book). Thus a 
mystical vision accompanies a critical moral vision. On this basis she describes 
some ten features of love as a theological norm (2013:167-173). There is no need to 
describe this analysis except to comment that love is understood here as a disposition 
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and not primarily as the quality of a relationship (which would have correlated with 
her notion of sin as a situation of alienation rather than as the disposition, thought, 
word or actions of an individual). This notion of love is developed further in relation 
to the concept of social justice in critical altercation with Reinhold Niebuhr’s views 
in this regard (2013:176-185, see also Rasmussen 2013:94-98). She then explains 
how neighbourly love as economic-ecological vocation implies compassion and 
justice (2013:199), but also the “triple bottom line” of ecological sustainability 
(2013:201-204), environmental equity in response to ecological debt (2013:207-211) 
and economic equity given the social impact of the globalised neo-liberal economic 
order and the undermining of democracy (2013: 214-217).
For Moe-Lobeda the task of Christian ethics is to provide a layout of the path from 
moral vision to emancipatory praxis in order to enable us to follow this path. Like 
Larry Rasmussen (again her mentor in this regard) she recognises that a changed 
moral vision affects all other elements of the moral life (Moe-Lobeda 2013:245), but 
does not suffice on its own. She agrees that moral vision entails both a critical and 
an inspiring dimension and adds that an emerging moral vision also changes one’s 
perception of what is possible, not only of what is wrong and of what should be 
(2013:246). Such a vision may be taken forward by identifying its defining features 
in terms of moral principles. For her these have to include ecological sustainability, 
environmental equity, economic equity and democracy (2013:247). Such principles 
require the formulation of goals or middle axioms in order to help us imagine how 
the vision will be realised, that is, what the first necessary steps may be on this path 
(2013:247-249). These goals still have to be translated in policies and a range of 
practices in order to realise such goals (2013:249-253). These have equal weight as 
transformed practices may affect policy changes while new policies will also induce 
appropriate practices (2013:253-255). Like Rasmussen, she recognises the key role 
of moral formation (the elephant in the room of social change – 2013:257). Again 
like Rasmussen, she recognises the danger of malformation and that communities 
can be patriarchal, restrictive and oppressive. The prime example of the practices 
that are required remains that of worship – through which we learn to see the world 
through God’s eyes (2013:259-260). The liturgy is a “school for seeing” (2013:263), 
for entertaining a different way of looking at the world. Where this does not happen, 
where worship services merely reflect the divisions in society (especially of class 
and race), such worship has already become idolatrous. This raises the question 
how affluent Christian communities in the global North can celebrate the Holy 
Communion, yet continue with patterns of life that induce suffering to others and 
that destroy ecosystems (2013:259). If Sunday 10h00 remains the “most segregated 
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hour”, this is a question that also plagues South African church life (see Van der 
Borght 2009).
Moe-Lobeda cannot answer this question, but that may well be the real question 
that she raises to her students and her readers in North America. Instead, she entices 
them to put love as justice into action. She concludes her book by describing eight 
“gateways” for resistance and rebuilding. This forms a crucial part of her argument in 
helping her readers to imagine the first necessary steps that may be required to bring 
about an alternative vision. These gateways include small-scale local and regional 
alternatives, fostering a moral culture in institutions, voluntary corporate social 
responsibility, publically mandated constraints, revoking the notion of “corporate 
personhood”, and prohibiting unwanted corporations through consumer action 
(Moe-Lobeda 2013:278-292). Again, these are neatly illustrated with life stories that 
can help readers to imagine how such gateways may be employed in their own local 
contexts.
4. THE CATEGORY OF MORAL VISION: DESMOND TUTU ON 
TRANSFIGURATION AND TRANSFORMATION
Both Rasmussen and Moe-Lobeda hold that an attractive moral vision provides the 
source of inspiration for moral action, for embracing the envisioned alternatives, for 
resisting evil, even for overcoming structural evil. A critical moral vision provides 
the source of energy for communities and organisations to become dynamos for 
social transformation.
This emphasis on moral vision, already developed in the map of the moral landscape 
in Birch and Rasmussen’s Bible & Ethics in the Christian Life (first edition 1976), 
has been very influential at the University of the Western Cape where I teach. In 
2000 we introduced a subject simply called “Ethics” that explores the “moral and 
religious foundations of society”. The subject may be taken as a major towards an 
undergraduate degree in Arts, Psychology or Theology. Student numbers have 
grown remarkably to reach around 700 first year students, 200 second year students 
and 150 third year students in 2014.
The curriculum draws on philosophy but also on religious studies in order to help 
students to understand the dynamics of moral formation taking place in local 
communities, civil organi sations and faith communities in South Africa. The 
emphasis is on a form of virtue ethics that recognises the need for responsible 
citizenship and not only personal virtue. Morality is therefore not reduced to 
dilemmas in moral decision making encountered in situations that are interesting 
but that our students would hardly ever come across. Ethical theory is not reduced 
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to debates on deontological and utilitarian approaches – although these are certainly 
addressed if only extensively at the third year level. Instead, explicitly following the 
examples in Birch and Rasmussen (1989), students are introduced to a map of the 
moral landscape that is developed in terms of the categories of a moral vision for the 
good society, the need for the formation of virtue towards responsible citizenship 
and then the need for understanding the role of values (also goals) and obligations 
(also rules) in moral decision making. The key here is to prioritise questions about 
the good society and to recognise the significance of an alternative moral vision. 
Indeed, the struggle against apartheid in South Africa was at its core a struggle for 
an alternative vision, namely a vision for a non-racist, non-sexist democracy in a 
unitary state. This is developed in a co-taught course entitled “A first introduction to 
ethical theory” that forms the theoretical foundation for the subject (see Conradie 
et al 2006).
This teaching programme is coupled with a current research project on the 
interplay between ecumenical theology and social ethics. The question behind this 
project is elicited by the “and” that links the two themes. There can be no doubt 
that religion plays a crucial role in social transformation, but also that religion can 
play a destructive and not only a constructive role. It can be used both to reinforce 
patriarchy and to resist violence against women and children. It can elicit reform 
but also deform movements (see Conradie & Pillay 2015). The moral power that 
can sustain social transformation in the face of many obstacles is clearly attractive 
in the public sphere, also in the corporate world. It is often assumed that the “moral 
capital” on which societies depend, is typically cultivated in religious communities. 
However, leaders in faith communities also recognise that a moral vision does 
not always lead to appropriate forms of praxis. Indeed, as Rasmussen repeatedly 
recognises, changed perceptions often follow behavioural change. Such behavioural 
change may be induced by a range of other factors that may well be beyond the 
sphere of influence of religious communities. This begs further questions about 
the interface between moral vision and moral praxis. This is where the two books 
by Rasmussen and Moe-Lobeda are so significant since they address this question 
head-on, albeit from within a quite different context.
At UWC this question is raised with specific reference to Desmond Tutu, the long-
standing former Chancellor of the university. A Desmond Tutu Chair of Ecumenical 
theology and Social Transformation in Africa has been established in the Department 
of Religion that has now also been coupled with a Desmond Tutu Centre for 
Spirituality and Society. In each case there is an “and” that invites further reflection. At 
the core of understanding this “and” lie ecumenical efforts to reflect on “ecclesiology 
and ethics” (see Best & Robra 1997), that is, on the relationship between what the 
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church is and what the church does. Rasmussen’s hand is distinctly visible in such 
ecumenical discourse on ecclesiology and ethics (see Rasmussen 1997). This tension 
between ecclesiology and ethics is related to other well-known theo logical tensions, 
for example, between the indicative of God’s grace and the imperative of God’s will, 
between liturgy and life, between the liberating message of God’s forgiveness, and 
the liberative praxis that follows from that, between justification and sanctification, 
between a compelling vision and moral discernment, and between dogmatics and 
ethics.
In the UWC project on ecumenical theology and social ethics it is often said in 
jest that Desmond Tutu somehow seems to have fathomed the relationship between 
spirituality and society because he tends to talk politics when he speaks as a church 
leader and starts praying when he engages in politics. Further investigation of Tutu’s 
oeuvre confirms that the key to keep the tension alive is for him a moral vision, a 
particular way of seeing the world. This is expressed in his ubuntu theology through 
the notion that we are all members of God’s family. It is perhaps best expressed in a 
small but significant book entitled God has a Dream (2005) in which key to Tutu’s 
theology may well be found. In this book he consistently employs the metaphor of 
God’s family. He observes that it makes a huge difference to see a beggar as your 
brother, a prostitute as your sister and a perpetrator of gross violations of human 
rights as your uncle. Tutu (2005:97) comments: “People really are wonderful. This 
does not mean that people cannot be awful and do real evil. They can. Yet as you 
begin to see with the eyes of God, you start to realize that people’s anger and hatred 
and cruelty come from their own pain and suffering. As we begin to see their words 
and behaviour as simply the acting out of their suffering, we can have compassion 
for them.” Tutu explains that by calling God Abba (our Father) we accept our 
oppressors and enemies as our brothers and sisters. They belong together with us in 
the family of God so that their humanity is caught up in our humanity just as ours 
is caught up in theirs (see Battle 1997:47). Tutu (2005:23) then explains the moral 
implications of such a vision:
In a happy family you don’t receive in proportion to your input. You receive in 
relation to your needs, the ones who make the least material contribution often 
being the ones who are most cared for – the young and the aged.
How I pray that in our world we can learn to emulate a true family. Perhaps 
then we could address the injustices that cause a small percentage of our 
world to consume the vast majority of its resources – not unlike what 
happened under apartheid in South Africa – while the vast majority lives in 
poverty, with over a billion people living on less than a dollar a day. Would 
you let your brother’s or sister’s family, your relatives eke out a miserably 
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existence in poverty? Would you let them go hungry? … If we realized that 
we are family, we would not let this happen to our brothers and sisters.
What conditions are required to allow for the emergence of such a moral vision? For 
Tutu, the key lies in an awareness of the presence of God through the Word and the 
Spirit in our midst, especially in the context of suffering and especially amongst the 
victims, but also the perpetrators. From a reformed perspective I would add that 
seeing others as members of God’s family does not come naturally and does not 
follow from a Gnostic form of insight amongst the educated elite only, but requires 
the inner illumination of the Holy Spirit. This ability to see the world through God’s 
eyes has little to do with good eyesight or helpful spotlights but with discerning 
the loving presence of God in our midst. This does not provide new light like a 
limelight, but it warms the heart and allows the broken figure to glow with God’s 
presence. One could say this works in the way that one would blush in the mere 
presence of one’s very first love. The same applies to Tutu’s own illustrious presence: 
When he is in a room this influences how people act and what they say- without him 
doing or saying anything!
For Tutu himself (as shaped by the Community of the Resurrection to which he 
belongs), this is best expressed in the biblical narratives on the transfiguration 
of Jesus on the moun tain. There his face, clothes and body became radiant and 
translucent with the lumi nosity of God’s presence (Tutu 2005:93). On the mountain 
Jesus, the rabbi from Nazareth, was revealed as more than an itinerant teacher and 
healer. The vision embedded in the experience of transfiguration enables us to see 
this Jesus from God’s perspective. The moment when this vision is grasped also 
yields the temptation to become like God, to escape from the world, to ascend the 
mountain even further. If so, the experience of transfiguration would become an 
aim in itself. This is corrected by the recognition that it is this human (Jesus) who is 
seen in a new light. The experience of seeing God is not an aim in itself but is always 
already a way of seeing this world through God’s eyes.
On this basis, in being sent down the mountain, we can also see other broken 
bodies from God’s perspective. As Desmond Tutu (2005:96) adds: “The divine 
shines through material that was thoroughly unpromising, unlikely, improbable.” 
Christological transfiguration is therefore inextricably linked with pneumatological 
transformation. This creative tension between transfiguration and transformation is 
epitomised in Tutu’s own ministry. It is a particular spiritual vision that elicits, inspires 
and sustains his social activism. The symbol of transfiguration lies at the very core 
of his spiritual vision. While this may have harboured the dangers of disconnection 
or escapism – as if the human being is supposed to become divine, this is evidently 
not Tutu’s understanding. Instead, the experiences of transfiguration enables one 
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too see both the oppressed and the oppressor as children of God, belonging to God’s 
own family, the household of God. Once this vision is entertained, the implications 
for social transformation become obvious. For Tutu, transfiguration cannot but 
lead to spiritual and social transformation. A lack of transformation would simply 
imply that the world has not yet been seen through God’s eyes. When one is then 
confronted with social problems where the world is viewed according to a very 
different and rather relentless capitalist or consumerist logic, this drives Tutu back 
on a daily basis to draw inspiration from his particular form of spirituality.
5. CONCLUSION: RESISTING STRUCTURAL EVIL
It needs to be acknowledged that there is another side to the story. It may be true 
that the imperative of God’s will becomes possible on the basis of the indicative of 
God’s grace. However, beliefs do not always shape values and praxis. There is a gap 
between what we believe (or think we believe) and what we know we ought to do but 
find ourselves somehow unable to do. What we confess to believe is not necessarily 
that which we put our trust in. There is all too often a tension between orthodoxy and 
orthopraxy, between our “ecclesiology” and our “ethics”. In a way this is intolerable: 
once one sees the world through God’s eyes, it cannot but transform one’s attitudes, 
actions and habits. But it is also true that vision is not enough. Perhaps moral inertia 
in the face of ecological destruction is not the result of the failure to see what is 
happening but the lack of hope that things can change (Moe-Lobeda 2013:153). 
It seems that faith and hope can be in tension with each other even though this 
is theologically indefensible. Reform movements are not always sustained. Worse: 
they may become distorted as deform movements.
In my view the two monographs by Rasmussen and Moe-Lobeda takes the debate 
in ecotheology forward on this very point without undermining the central role of 
moral vision. They realise that “acting” without “seeing” and “judging” is dangerous. 
This requires what Moe-Lobeda terms a “critical moral vision”. It requires a detailed 
social analysis of the current global economic order and its impact on socio-economic 
inequalities and ecological destruction. Moreover, it requires an understanding of 
the nature of structural violence. She does not elaborate on the subsequent “spiral of 
violence” (widely used in theologies of liberation) where structural violence prompts 
revolutionary violence, only to be followed by repressive violence. Her discussion 
of hegemony (2013:86f) is at least a helpful step in that direction. The narratives 
that she includes also hint at the obstacles to resistance and the repression of such 
resistance to defend corporate interests.
Moe-Lobeda also realises that a description of structural violence remains 
insufficient if not complemented by a theological “judging” of such violence in 
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terms of the notion of structural evil. She realises that more needs to be said about 
the relationship between structural evil, natural evil and metaphysical evil (the 
condition of finitude) (see 2013:64), but does not tackle this thorny problem. She 
hints at the dialectic between sin and evil where evil is regarded as the cumulative 
impact of sin – where collective wrongdoing has become embedded in the structures 
of society in such a way that humans have become trapped in a situation from which 
they cannot escape. She offers some discussion on the nature of sin (2013:58) but her 
main aim it to explore the structural dimension of evil. In this way she complements 
Rasmussen’s excellent discussion of the very nature of sin – which in my view is 
unsurpassed in Christian ecotheology.
It seems to me what is needed here is a more sophisticated theological under standing 
of the notion of human sin, both as power and as guilt – one that resists an easy 
classification of human ity into perpetrators and their innocent victims (on the one 
hand) and an equally easy uni versalising assessment that we are all sinners before 
God (on the other). Any distinc tions can become inverted: victims may victimise 
others (illustrated by gangsters), while perpetrators may be transformed by the grace 
of forgive ness. As the South African Truth and Reconcilia tion Commission helped 
us to see, there are also willing and unwilling beneficiaries and some bystanders 
and spectators who are not always so innocent (see also Moe-Lobeda’s mentioning 
of active thieves, passive profiteers and deprived victims – 2013:57). It may be true 
that we are all victims of structural violence and have all contributed to it, but the 
responsibility and the burdens are not equally distributed so that there may be a need 
to speak about the proportionality of guilt (see Conradie 2013:45-52). Those who 
are per pe trators of one form of structural violence may be victims of another form 
(see Moe-Lobeda 2013:74). Perpetrators of violence and those who benefit from 
structural violence them selves eventually become victims of the system. Those who 
are in prison may be free (Nelson Mandela comes to mind), while those in positions 
of immense power may be held captive by their ideologies and suffer psychologically 
from that.
This focus on evil as rooted in human sin is crucial in order to recognise the roots of 
environmental destruction. Accordingly, the core of the problem does not lie with 
God, God’s creation, nature, evolution, vulnerability, and anxiety or with the human 
species as such. The only (!) problem is human sin – which is something contingent 
that can and in Christ has indeed been resolved. This liberating view on human sin 
as the root of the problem may seem to be too good to be true given the immensity of 
the powers that rule the global economy and the scale of destruction. The emphasis 
on the confession of sin is therefore resisted in many cultural contexts.
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It has been far from easy to maintain such a focus on sin as the primary problem 
once questions around the origin of sin (including the notion of original sin) are 
explored. Where does sin come from? From evil, but where does evil come from? 
From the devil, but where does the devil come from? From God? The classic Christian 
position is that sin is finally inexplicable and that, if anything, humanity as a whole 
is to be blamed. However, the tempta tion to explain sin does not go away easily. Sin 
may, for example, be “explained” with reference to the struggle for the survival of 
the fittest (the “selfish gene”) or human anxiety over finitude. The focus thus shifts to 
the underlying structures of being embodied, especially to vulnerability, mortality, 
transience and the limitations of human power and knowledge. If so, God’s good 
creation becomes part of the pro blem. This has to be a concern for any adequate 
ecotheology.
In contemporary theology this line of thinking typically begs further questions 
around natural suffering and natural evil. Would an emphasis on human sin not 
under estimate the problem of natural suffering? Can all forms of suffering really 
be derived from human sin? What other sources of suffering may be identified? 
Has something gone wrong with the evolution of life on earth, irrespective of the 
emergence of the human species? Is there a sense in which nature too has to be 
redeemed (irrespective of human impact), for example with reference to the violence 
and brutality that characterise relation ships between non-human animals? What 
exactly is the problem from which the earth has to be saved?
This set of problems clearly requires further investigation. At UWC we hope 
to investigate this theme in more depth in a future project on “Redeeming sin: 
Hamartology, ecology and social analysis” in which the question will be how a 
Christian confession of sin can be retrieved and portrayed as good news for the 
whole earth (see also Cloete 2013, Conradie 2005, Conradie & Sakuba 2006).
The core strength of the two monographs does not only lie in the emphasis on moral 
vision or on social analysis (“seeing”). Both Rasmussen and Moe-Lobeda realise 
that “seeing” and “judging” need to be followed by “acting”. They realise the central 
problem of Christian ethics, namely that knowing God’s will does not necessarily lead 
to doing God’s will. They therefore analyse the obstacles in this regard and indicate 
what acting entails in order to resist the dominant powers and to rebuild sustainable 
communities. These are most welcome contributions to global ecumenical discourse 
and clearly take the debate in ecotheology forward on this point.
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